http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/139 Mon, 25 May 2026 08:21:24 GMT 2026-05-25T08:21:24Z http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1156 Title: Empirics of Child Labour: A Study of an Indian State Authors: Ghose, Manas Abstract: The problem of child labour is a multifaceted hydra. It is simply not possible to comprehend the problem using some simple theoretical constructs or causal empirics. Various aspects of this phenomenon are considered here. Specifically we concentrated on the so-called inverted U-hypothesis that posits a rise in child labour as family asset rises while falling eventually. For this, we have considered different types of regressions. Our study reveals the inverted U hypothesis to be valid in those cases where the probability of a child being send to labour market (given the other conditions) is very low. In such cases a rise in family assets, enhance the utilization of child labour. Tue, 01 Jan 2013 00:00:00 GMT http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1156 2013-01-01T00:00:00Z http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1155 Title: Corruption in Recruitment of Public Sector Jobs in West Bengal: Causes and Consequences Authors: Ghose, Manas Abstract: This paper explores the causes and consequences of corruption in recruitment of public sector job in India. Causes of corruption has two sides- supply side and demand side. High competition in the recruitment of public sector job or high educated unemployment rate is the main (direct) cause of corruption from the supply side. On the other hand, high rent seeking activity, high discretionary power vested to the administrator and low accountability of the administrators are the main source of corruption from the demand side. Apart from these, lack of certainty, consistency and transparency in framing the rules and regulations are also the sources of corruption from the demand side. Corruption reduces the probability of getting a public sector job to the fresher candidates. The potential educated youth become hopeless. It will have a negative impact on attainment of educational institution of the youth. The high degree of corruption may break the trust of the common people on government/ political leader (concerned ministers). Through corruption (bribe) huge amount of black money is generated in the economy that may increase inflation, income inequality in income distribution. Corruption reduces the consumer surplus of the government. Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1155 2025-01-01T00:00:00Z http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1154 Title: Sex Ratio In India: Introspecting The Changing Scenario Authors: Ghose, Manas Abstract: Sex Ratio (SR) in India is adverse and alarming. Census data reveals that SR of India drastically increases from 102.9 in 1901 to 107.9 in 1991 and exhibits a slightly falling tendency in the Twenty First century. World Population Prospect-2022 data also show the almost same trend. In such a situation the present paper tries to explain the factors responsible for such an adverse SR of Indian population. Using Indian Population Census data and World Population Prospect-2022 data of United Nations this paper finds that Natural SR in India is unfavourable. Nature produces a SR at the time of birth which is significantly greater than 100. Use of sex selective abortions using modern technology adds some fuel to the fire of unfavourable SR and makes it more unfavourable. Enactment of Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Act, 1994 in India only reduces some extent of the adverse effect of modern technology on SR but not eliminate it completely. Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1154 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1153 Title: Economic Impact of Prohibition of Sale of Land Owned by Scheduled Tribes to Non- Scheduled Tribes in India Authors: Ghose, Manas Abstract: The West Bengal Land Reforms Act-1955 imposed a restriction on sale of land owned by a Scheduled Tribe to a non- Scheduled Tribe person. Not only West Bengal, but most of the Indian states (which have Scheduled area) imposed this type of restriction to protect the Rights of Land to the Scheduled Tribes as well as from unwanted and distress sale of land by the Scheduled Tribes. This paper tries to explore the economic impact of this restriction theoretically. This restriction divides the entire land market into two segments. One segment is for Scheduled Tribes and another segment is for non-Scheduled Tribes. Imposition of this restriction makes the Scheduled Tribes land owner a lame duck. Non-Scheduled Tribes land owner also loses from this restriction. Only difference is that the extent of per unit loss is higher for Scheduled Tribes land owner. In this act a discretionary power is given to the land Revenue Officer regarding permission to sale a piece of land to a non- Scheduled Tribes by the Scheduled Tribes. That opens up the broad avenue of corruption. The Land Revenue Officer may take a bribe for granting permission to sale a piece of land owned by a Scheduled Tribe to a non- Scheduled Tribe. In that case the policy originates a source of corruption with/without prohibiting unwanted and distress sale of land of Scheduled Tribes land owner. The policy makes land acquisition more difficult and retarding economic development of the country by slowing down industrialisation, urbanisation etc. Sun, 01 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/1153 2026-03-01T00:00:00Z